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Abstract 
This paper presents evidence on the wide range of adverse shocks reported by African households. 
The current financial and economic crisis adds another layer of risk to al-ready vulnerable households 
and firms. In responding to an adverse shock, households are involved in a balancing act that is aimed 
at maintaining consumption and/or assets above critical levels. Households mainly use coping 
mechanisms that depend on family and other networks and self-insurance. There is limited recourse to 
public social protection and formal credit and insurance markets. The paper examines some informal 
financial arrangements. Some of these are not designed to smooth consumption when there is an 
adverse shock. These informal mechanisms have the potential to be the platform to expand access and 
utilisation of formal finance particularly in rural communities. There is a clear role for publicly 
provided interventions. This is because informal risk sharing mechanisms do not cover all shocks. The 
premium paid may not be adequate to cover the entire financial implications of the shock. Finally, the 
design of the risk-sharing institutions can result in the very poor being excluded. 
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The interplay of the structure of African economies, low infrastructure development, the weakness or 
absence of institutions that reduce the incidence of hazards and the impact of adverse events can partly 
explain the vulnerability of African economies. The concentration of export earnings on a limited 
number of primary products exposes the economies to risks due to fluctuations in the terms of trade. 
The increasing openness of these economies in the wake of the implementation of trade liberalisation 
exposes them to the vagaries of the world economy. The dependence of a large proportion of the 
African population on rain-fed agriculture as a source of livelihood exposes incomes to risks due to the 
vagaries of the weather. The still substantial proportions of rural and urban households that do not 
have access to safe water and safe sanitation suggest vulnerability to disease. 
African households use a wide variety of measures to respond to adverse events. However, most 
coping strategies used by households are informal insurance mechanisms. Very little use is made of 
instruments of the formal financial sector and public social protection interventions. 
This paper will begin by discussing the shocks reported by African households. It will review the 
different coping strategies used by households when they are hit by negative shocks. It will examine 
what role informal and formal financial institutions have played in the response of African households 
to shocks. It will assess the extent to which traditional strategies and public social protection 
interventions enhance the resilience of households when a shock occurs. It will conclude, by providing 
some recommendations on the possible role which informal and formal institutions can play in 
reducing the impact of shocks, for example, the current financial crisis on African households. 
2. Vulnerability, Risks and Shocks in the African Context 
Vulnerability may be defined as the probability of a decline in well-being or welfare in the future. 
Vulnerability depends on the exposure to risk and the capacity of the individual, household or firm to 
reduce the impact of the shock or risk event that has occurred. Sinha and Lipton (1999, p.5) define risk 
as “a damaging fluctuation that is not certain in any given period but is possible often with a numerical 
probability”. Some damaging fluctuations are perfectly predicted. For example, farmers know with 
certainty that there will be a dry season. Farmers, however, do not know with certainty when the rains 
will arrive and if the expected quantum will be realised. According to Sinha and Lipton (1999), it is 
the realisation of unexpected damaging events such as theft of livestock or the destruction of one’s 
property by fire that may be described as an adverse “shock”. However, certainty of the occurrence of 
a damaging event will not necessarily reduce a household, firm or individual’s vulnerability if the 
capacity to protect income or consumption from the impact of the damaging event is limited. 
A not significant proportion of African households are vulnerable to poverty. Using data from the 
fourth living standards survey in 1998/99, the proportion of the population vulnerable to poverty in 
Ghana was estimated at almost 50 percent. Vulnerability was higher amongst rural than amongst urban 
households (Appiah-Kubi et al., 2008). In rural Kenya, the proportion of vulnerable households was 
estimated at 20 percent (Christiaensen and Subbarao, 2001). 
Objective indicators of risk in Africa are, for example, the variability of rainfall, the proportion of 
households without access to safe drinking water and safe sanitation, the seasonality in prices and the 
incidence of reported crime. The incidence of self-reported shocks is another indicator of the extent 
and nature of the risk and shocks facing African households. In a survey conducted in three districts in 
Ghana in 2004 using recall data over a two-year period, 70 per cent of households in two of the 
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districts/municipalities (Tema and Atwima) and 90 per cent of households in the third district reported 
shocks (National Development Planning Commission and UNDP, 2004a, 2004b). The third district, 
Builsa is much poorer (estimated poverty headcount of 98 per cent) than the other two, and has a much 
larger proportion of the households earning a livelihood in agriculture. In Tanzania, about two-thirds 
of rural households surveyed in Kilimanjaro and Ruvuma reported shocks that affected their 
livelihoods during a five-year period (Sango et al., 2007). 
Households reporting shocks tend to be hit by more than one shock. In the largely urban 
municipality of Ghana, i.e., Tema, the majority of households reported one or two shocks. This 
contrasts with Builsa, the largely rural district in which more than half of the households reported 
more than four shocks in the two-year period (National Development Planning Commission and 
UNDP, 2004b). The average number of reported shocks amongst the rural households in Tanzania was 
2.1. There was no difference in the incidence of reported shocks between poor and non-poor 
households (Sango et al., 2007). 
Sinha and Lipton (1999) identify a set of events that they describe as damaging fluctuations that 
will increase the probability of consumption expenditures or income falling below the poverty line. 
These are: 
•  Disease or injury; 
•  Violence, i.e., domestic, criminal or war related; 
•  Natural disasters; 
•  Terms of trade deterioration; 
•  Reduced access to productive income or work. 
This list is not exhaustive but presents what they consider the most frequent occurring damaging 
fluctuations. 
In Ethiopia, households reported harvest failure, labour problems (i.e., illness, death or the divorce 
of a household member that resulted in a shortage of labour in the household), policy problems (for 
example, a ban on migration or forced labour), livestock problems, land problems (for example, loss 
of land due to disputes), asset losses, war and crime as events that had caused loss of income or wealth 
over a twenty year period (Dercon and Krishnan, 2000). Evidence from Ghana shows there is wide 
variation in reported shocks between rural and urban households. Rural households (Builsa district) 
tended to report shocks due to loss of assets, i.e., death and theft of livestock. Loss of harvests through 
pest infestation, poor rains, disease and theft were the next most important adverse shocks reported by 
these households (Figure 1). Amongst urban households (Tema Municipality) changes in the prices of 
output, inputs, food and utilities were the most frequently reported shocks. Evidence from other 
African countries finds that ill-health, death and weather-related shocks are most frequently reported 
(Harrower and Hoddinnot, 2005; Sanga et al., 2007). It has been observed that “poor people’s shocks 
are not more severe than those of others” (de Weerdt, 2009, p.14). A major difference between the two 
is the options available to respond to shocks. 
The impact on Africa of the current global financial crisis will be felt largely through its second 
round effects. These possible second round effects are the slow down in demand for imports, decline 
in remittances sent to Africa, reduction in aid flows and reduction in contributions to international 
NGOs. Countries such as Ghana have recorded declines in export earnings and remittances in the third 
quarter of 2008. These second round effects are expected to impact the government budget and 
households adversely. Incomes of households producing export crops are expected to be negatively 
affected, as will the incomes of households that receive remittances from abroad. The decline in 
contributions received by international NGOs can result in cuts in their budgets, thus adversely 
impacting on their activities. The current global crisis and its impact on African economies adds an 
additional layer of risk and uncertainty to already risk-prone communities and households. Adverse Shocks and Social Protection in Africa: What Role for Formal and Informal Financial Institutions? 
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3. Impact of Shocks 
Adverse shocks have short- and long-term impacts on households and individuals. Seasonality, an 
event with a high degree of predictability is correlated with a decline in consumption. The estimates of 
the chronic and transient poor in Ethiopia provided in Table 1 is, for a short sample period of eighteen 
months, thus capturing the effect of seasonality on poverty and therefore intra-year variability of 
poverty. 
Figure 1: Shocks Reported by Households in a Rural and Urban District 
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Shocks Reported by Households Builsa District
 
Source: National Development Planning Commission and UNDP (2004) District Human Development Report 
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Reported Shocks, Tema Municipality
 
Source: National Development Planning Commission and UNDP (2004) District Human Development Report 
2004. Tema Municipality, Accra. 
Adverse shocks can have long-term impacts. Amongst rural Ethiopian households, droughts in the 
preceding four years had a negative impact on consumption per capita in 2004. Illness of the head or 
another member of the household, and decrease in output prices also negatively impacted on 
consumption per capita (Dercon 2008). Rural households in Kenya experiencing illness and rainfall 
shocks are likely to experience a decline in consumption in the future (Christiaensen and Subbarao, 
2001). In Cote d’Ivoire the enrolment of both boys and girls in school declined after an adverse 
weather shock. There was also evidence of an increase in malnutrition amongst children in areas that 
experienced the shock (Jensen, 2000). The decline in investments in the education and health of 
children in the aftermath of a shock can have long-run negative impacts. Poor investments in health 
and education can result in lower earnings in the future. It has been estimated that, in Zimbabwe, for 
example, the effect of a shock that resulted in stunted growth of children could compromise 
educational attainment and result in a loss in lifetime earnings (Dercon 2008). 
The decline in consumption in the aftermath of a shock means that some households or individuals 
could become poor or else, if already poor, remain in poverty. In some countries, the transient poor, 
i.e., persons who have moved in or out of poverty can be substantial (Table 1). The negative impact of 
shocks on consumption that can explain some of the movements of substantial shares of the population 
above and below the poverty line and the evidence of incomplete insurance (see discussion below) 
suggests a weakness in the coping strategies of households. 
4. Coping with Adverse Shocks 
In responding to an adverse shock, households are involved in a balancing act that is aimed at 
maintaining consumption and/or assets above critical levels. Households use a wide variety of 
measures to manage risk and to respond to adverse shocks when they occur. These are mainly coping 
mechanisms that depend on family (nuclear and extended) and other networks and self-insurance (for 
example, the sale of assets). There is limited recourse to public social protection and to formal credit 
and insurance markets. Adverse Shocks and Social Protection in Africa: What Role for Formal and Informal Financial Institutions? 
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Table 1: Transient and Chronic Poverty in Selected African Countries 
Author  Country  Length of Period 










Cote d’Ivoire  2 years; 2 data points 
2 years; 2 data points 










Haddad and Ahmed 
(2002) 
Egypt  2 years; 2 data points  19.0  20.0  61.0 
Dercon and 
Krishnan (2000) 
Ethiopia  12mths; 2 data points 
5mths; 2 data points 












Uganda  4 years; 2 data points 

























Notes: chronic poor households are those households that were found to have welfare measures below the 
poverty line in all the years for which data is available. 
What determines the coping strategies that individuals or households will use when faced with a 
shock? Dercon (2000) stressed the role of the type of shocks on the ability of households to cope with 
their consequences. The coping strategies are likely to differ between idiosyncratic and covariate 
shocks. Covariate shocks that have a much broader coverage in terms of incidence will be more 
difficult to insure by using informal risk-sharing measures. In Tanzania, it was found that households 
were more likely to receive assistance from others when the shocks were idiosyncratic than if they 
were covariate (Sango et al., 2007). Predicted shocks – the onset of the hunger season, for example- 
would generate a different set of responses from the households compared to unpredicted shocks. 
The coping strategy utilised is also determined by the existence of, and access to, functioning credit 
and insurance markets, the household’s stock of physical and financial assets, the nature of the social 
networks the household or individual is connected to, i.e., the relationship that the household has with 
better asset-endowed households, the frequency of shocks, expectations about possible future shocks 
and the existence of public social protection interventions. 
In the Lacustre Zone in Mali, for example, a loss of crops due to insect infestation would lead to 
out-migration, whilst households would tend to sell livestock when there was a loss of livestock. 
Differences were observed between the asset-poor and non-asset poor households in the use of coping 
strategies in response to some shocks. For example, amongst households reporting a loss of crops due 
to insect infestation both asset-poor and non-asset poor households responded by out-migration. In 
addition, asset-poor households were more likely to receive remittances (Harrower and Hoddinnot, 
2005). 
A comparison of the coping strategies used by households in Builsa, a poor rural and agricultural 
district in Ghana, and Tema, one of Ghana’s two urban port cities, which is an industrial hub, reveals 
some interesting differences. Whereas Builsa households report using self-insurance strategies for all 
reported shocks, this was not the case in Tema (Figure 2). The most frequently cited response to 
shocks by Builsa households, which is classified as self-insurance, is the sale of livestock and other 
assets. The next most frequent strategy that was resorted to was reduction in consumption, 
particularly, food consumption. Half of the households reported reduced food consumption as a coping 
strategy, compared to just over a quarter of households in Tema. Builsa, is a poor district in the Abena D. Oduro 
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savannah zone, where poverty is endemic. The greater incidence in reduction in consumption as a 
coping strategy suggests either a low incidence of risk-sharing in those communities and/or or a desire 
to maintain assets above a critical level against future shocks. In the context of uncertainty about 
future shocks, households may allow consumption to decline in order to maintain their assets against 
future shocks. In Burkina Faso, the response of households to drought was to minimise the use of their 
assets (i.e., livestock) for consumption smoothing. Consumption declined for both poor and non-poor 
households (Kazianga and Udry, 2006). 
Figure 2: Coping Strategies Reported by Rural and Urban Households, Ghana 
0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 90.0 100.0
% of affected households that applied strategy
Loss of property due to fire
Loss of property due to flooding
Death of livestock
Loss of property due to riots
Theft of unharvested crops
Increase in major food prices
Theft of harvested crops
Theft of other property
Flooding affecting harvest
Poor rains affecting harvest
Disability of income earner
Theft of cash
Illness of income earner
Plant disease
Death of one sending remittance
Loss of harvest by bushfire
Increase in input prices
Theft of livestock
Price increases in utilities
Death of working member
Decline in output prices
Pest invasion affecting storage
Pest invasion affecting harvest







Source: National Development Planning Commission and UNDP (2004) District Human Development Report 
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Source: National Development Planning Commission and UNDP (2004) District Human Development Report 
2004. Tema Municipality, Accra. 
There was a much greater reported reliance on savings in Tema (20 percent) than in Builsa (5 percent). 
Amongst rural households in Kilimanjaro and Ruvuma in Tanzania, about three quarters of the 
households responded to shocks by using their cash savings. Savings are most often built up using 
informal mechanisms, instead of using banks and insurance companies. 
Traditional coping mechanisms that provide social protection are “centuries old” (Connink and 
Drani (mimeo)). The family – nuclear and extended -, friends and neighbours, have traditionally been 
the basis of informal insurance networks. Amongst the Buganda in Uganda, the clan provides help 
when there is a death in the family. The extended family provides support to orphans and widows. 
Traditional mechanisms continue to operate but, in some instances, they have weakened over time 
(Connink and Drani, (mimeo)). Mutual insurance may not be able to provide complete insurance when 
shocks are covariate and/or frequent, and if the network is not geographically spread out. For 
individuals and households that have geographically spread out networks, recourse can still be made to 
the network for insurance, depending on the geographic coverage of the shock. When there is 
migration, family networks may no longer be concentrated in one community. In countries with a 
large emigrant network, mutual insurance networks can span continents (Muzzacato, 2009). Empirical 
work investigating the extent of consumption smoothing may not be able to confirm full insurance 
because the insurance network is not properly defined. 
Mutual insurance mechanisms modelled on traditional practices tend to exclude the poor when 
participation in the network requires monetary contribution (Connink and Drani, (mimeo)). People 
provide loans and insurance to other people that they know. Poor people are less likely to be included 
in the social network of the wealthier groups. Thus, they will be less likely to benefit from informal 
transfers when they are hit by shocks (Santos and Barret, 2008). Abena D. Oduro 
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4.1 The Role of Informal and Formal Finance 
Functioning credit and insurance markets should provide opportunities to households to smooth 
consumption without depleting assets in the process. The use of formal loan instruments to smooth 
consumption is not widespread. For example, in Ghana, about 6 per cent of respondents in Tema and 
11 per cent of respondents in Builsa had taken a loan from a financial institution in response to a 
shock. In addition to borrowing from friends and relatives, households purchased on credit and sold 
their harvest in advance. 
Informal finance is an important insurance mechanism for households and individuals. Households 
borrow from friends and relatives – in cash or in kind, and purchases are made on credit. 
One explanation for the existence of the large informal financial sector in developing countries was 
the repressive financial system that prevailed in many of these countries (McKinnon, 1973 and Shaw, 
1973). Government intervention, such as interest rate ceilings, increased the demand for finance whilst 
discouraging supply. The formal sector was constrained whilst the informal sector expanded to satisfy 
the demand for credit. Another explanation for the co-existence of the formal and informal finance 
sectors was the challenge of imperfect information and contract enforcement. Weak legal systems 
made contract enforcement costly and thus restricted the activities of formal sector lenders (Steel et 
al., 1997). 
Several years after the implementation of financial sector reforms that made headway in 
liberalising the financial sector, the informal financial sector remains a major source of finance for 
consumption smoothing and the provision of working capital (Steel et al., 1997). Indeed, the semi-
formal (micro-finance) and formal financial sectors utilise some of the methods of the informal sector 
(Basu et al., 2004). 
The continued importance of informal finance may be explained by push and pull factors. The 
geographical coverage of banks and financial institutions is limited, and rural and remote communities 
are poorly served by these institutions. Micro-finance programmes have much broader coverage. 
Formal financial institutions are unlikely to expand coverage in the rural economy until they can 
adequately deal with the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Financiers from outside a 
local economy will require a local financial intermediary to monitor borrowers. This local financial 
intermediary must also put up his/her own capital. This lowers the cost of intermediation to the outside 
financier and acts as a commitment device to ensuring that the local monitor will not renege on 
monitoring responsibilities. Having a local monitor can also reduce the collateral requirements and 
expand access of finance to the poor (Conning and Udry, 2005). The limited penetration of formal 
financial intermediaries in rural areas may be because of a scarcity of local intermediaries with capital 
(Conning and Kevane, 2002). 
In addition to constraints on physical access because of limited geographical coverage, there is also 
the issue of economic access to banks. A recent cross-country study on banking institutions in 
developing and developed countries provides further evidence to explain why a large proportion of the 
population may not have access to banks even when physical distance is not a problem (Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Peria, 2008). Table 2 below extracts some of the information collected during the 
survey. In several African countries, the minimum amount needed to open a bank account is beyond 
the reach of poor households. The minimum size of consumer loans may be too large for poor 
households. Adverse Shocks and Social Protection in Africa: What Role for Formal and Informal Financial Institutions? 
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Table 2: Conditions to Operate a Bank Account in Selected African Countries 
Country
Minimum to open 
checking account 
(% GDP per 
capita)
Minimum to be 
maintained in 
account (% GDP 
per capita)
Minimum lent out 
as consumer loan 
(% GDP per 
capita)
Cameroon 116.39 55.88 78.53
Egypt 0.35 0.18 5.84
Ethiopia 55.41 n.a 178.16
Ghana 22.69 0.09 111.94
Kenya 22.71 0.00 186.42
Mali 38.86 0.00 24.06
Malawi 0.00 0.00 222.36
Mozambique 29.61 14.90 30.71
Nigeria 106.42 0.00 n.a
Sierra Leone 51.61 8.81 143.55
South Africa 0.00 0.00 7.27
Uganda 51.12 1.73 205.75
Zambia 0.00 0.00 n.a
Zimbabwe 0.00 0.00 24.08  
Source: Beck et al., 2008 
Some informal lending involves significantly higher interest rates compared to borrowing from the 
formal sector. The high interest costs of the private money-lender are partly due to the costs of 
monitoring. However, the transaction costs (pecuniary and time costs) incurred when contracting an 
informal sector loan may be much lower than in the formal sector. Thus, depending on the size of the 
loan, it may be less costly to contract the loan from the informal sector. 
The costs of default to the borrower may be lower when borrowing from the informal sector 
compared to the formal sector. This is because informal lenders may provide state-contingent loans 
(Udry, 1994). Thus, if the borrower should be hit by an adverse shock that makes it difficult to keep up 
with loan payments, the interest cost on a loan in the formal sector can become quite large if penalty 
payments are imposed. An informal lender may not impose such stringent conditions if it is observed 
that the default is because of a real difficulty in meeting payments because of an extraneous shock. 
Thus, for households, firms and individuals operating in risky environments with a large element of 
uncertainty, there will be a high probability of default in payments. The informal sector may be the 
preferred choice for sourcing a loan (Guirkinger, 2008). 
The design of informal finance institutions addresses the information asymmetries and enforcement 
problems that bedevil the formal financial institutions. Default risk of informal lenders is low, but not 
non-existent (Steel et al., 1997). The information asymmetries that are the bane of formal financial 
institutions are overcome because of proximity between lenders and borrowers. Examples of informal 
institutions that have mechanisms designed to circumvent these problems are funeral associations and 
revolving savings and credit associations (Roscas). These arrangements are more suited to dealing 
with idiosyncratic shocks than with covariate shocks. 
4.1.1 The Funeral Associations 
Funeral associations are established to provide insurance against death-related shocks. In addition to 
death-related shocks, these organisations can provide insurance against other adverse shocks. For Abena D. Oduro 
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example, funeral associations in (Cotonou) Benin provide insurance coverage for death shocks, illness, 
loss of job and destruction of property (LeMay-Boucher, 2007). Insurance is also provided when there 
are “happy” events, such as the birth of a child, marriage and anniversaries. Although the focus of this 
paper has been on adverse shocks, positive happy shocks can require large expense that can undermine 
the long-term welfare of the individual or household. Although these institutions are described as 
informal, some of them operate with written rules and regulations (LeMay-Boucher, 2007). 
Membership rules of funeral associations in Ethiopia, Benin and Tanzania, for example, require that 
new members must put in applications. In some groups, existing members have to approve the 
application of the prospective member. In most groups, membership fees are required (LeMay-
Boucher, 2007 and Dercon et al., 2004). These requirements are a screening mechanism to reduce the 
incidence of adverse selection and to ensure commitment. The activities that are insured are clearly 
defined in order to reduce the incidence of moral hazard. In Tanzania, for example, if insurance is paid 
out to cover the cost of illness evidence in the form of hospital fees has to be provided (Dercon et al., 
2004). Membership of these groups is not only for insurance purposes, but also for social reasons. 
The membership fees and, in some cases, the requirement of payment of a regular premium can 
result in the poor being excluded from these groups. Even though, in the communities surveyed in 
Ethiopia, participation in these groups was extensive, there was larger participation amongst the 
wealthier households. There was a significant positive relationship between income and whether a 
person or household would be a member of a funeral association (Dercon et al., 2004 and LeMay-
Boucher, 2007). Members in default may be subject to exclusion from the group, fines, public warning 
or bringing the person before a local court (LeMay-Boucher, 2007). Invariably, the fear of shame is 
expected to play an important role in reducing the incidence of default. 
4.1.2 Revolving Savings and Credit Associations 
Revolving savings and credit associations (Roscas) are widespread across the continent and can be 
found in both rural and urban communities. The Rosca is a group of people who come together at 
regular intervals to make contributions into a fund that is distributed to one of its members at each 
meeting until each member has received money from the fund. Interest is not earned on the fund. The 
members of the Rosca are normally from within the neighbourhood and thus know one another. This 
contributes to ensuring commitment to the association and should reduce the risk of default. When 
each person has received money from the fund, the group could be dissolved or the cycle is started 
over again. The Rosca contains both the element of saving and lending. The first person to receive 
money from the fund is a borrower, since he or she is receiving money up front. The last person to 
receive money from the fund is a saver since he or she would have been making regular contributions 
to the fund until such time as it was his or her turn. To reduce risk and enforce commitment newer 
members are placed in the last positions. The placement of an individual in the cycle can be random or 
through bidding. 
Membership of Roscas is used to finance expenditures such as school fees, the purchase of farm 
inputs and food (Kimuyu, 1999). The design of the Rosca does not lend it to be an effective insurance 
mechanism. This is because the timing of one’s turn in the cycle will not coincide with when an 
adverse shock occurs. However, some Rosca arrangements can be designed to include a fund that 
provides loans with interest (van den Brink and Chavas, 1997). 
4.2 The Effectiveness of Coping Strategies 
Empirical evidence suggests that households are not able to insure fully against risk. Risk-sharing 
activities may make it possible for the household or individual to insure against idiosyncratic risks. For 
example, the events that funeral associations normally provide insurance against are largely 
idiosyncratic risks. Adverse Shocks and Social Protection in Africa: What Role for Formal and Informal Financial Institutions? 
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Not all households are involved in risk-sharing networks. Evidence has been cited (see page 10) to 
show that the poor are more likely to be left out of these arrangements. Thus, some households and 
individuals are able to insure against idiosyncratic shocks (Harrower and Hoddinnot, 2005; 
Hoogeveen, 2003), whilst others cannot (de Weerdt, 2009). Households are less likely to insure fully 
against covariate risks (Harrower and Hoddinnot, 2005 and Hoogeveen, 2003). The risk-sharing 
arrangements may provide partial, but not full, insurance, because contributions may not be large 
enough to cover the full cost of the shock. The movement of households in and out of poverty over 
time is suggestive of the absence or weaknesses of risk management mechanisms that can adequately 
protect households from falling into poverty when there are shocks. 
4.3 Increasing the Use of Formal and Informal Finance as Coping Strategies 
The high level of risk in African economies and the evidence that households are not able to protect 
consumption completely against adverse shocks suggests that there must be a large demand for 
insurance. A study of rural households in Tanzania finds that there is a demand for insurance against 
price fluctuations and rainfall shocks. The willingness to pay for insurance depends on the availability 
of cash to pay for the insurance (Sarris et al., 2007). Ability to pay for the premium is a problem that 
faces other types of insurance. 
The relative success both Roscas and funeral associations appear to have in terms of circumventing 
the problems of information asymmetry and enforcement, suggest that they should be the ideal local 
financial intermediary to link up with formal financial institutions. Some of these organisations have, 
over the years, accumulated financial capital (Dercon et al., 2004). There are challenges associated 
with this kind of co-operation that must be addressed if these arrangements are to be successful. 
Informal insurance groups tend to be small in size and the loans that they provide tend not to be large. 
The success of the Roscas and the funeral associations is because their relatively small size allows 
them to screen and monitor at reasonable costs. A programme linking them to formal financial 
institutions should be careful not to expand the size of the associations beyond what is optimal to 
continue to perform these functions effectively. The experience of micro-finance organisations that 
expand too quickly is that staff get over-stretched and diverted from their core functions. This leads to 
frustration amongst loan officers and amongst members of the micro-finance groups leading to an 
increase in default rates (Dixon et al., 2007). There are limits to the extent that group dynamics can 
influence the payment behaviour of members. When an increasingly large proportion of the money of 
the organisation does not belong to the group, the effectiveness of the group to insure against default 
declines and the need for an external monitor increases. 
5. The Role of Public Social Protection Interventions 
With the exception of the pensions that tend to be provided to retired public sector workers, publicly 
provided social protection is a relatively new phenomenon in Africa. Where it is available, it is 
provided on a pilot basis and only covers a fraction of the eligible population (Table 3). Abena D. Oduro 
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Table 3: Social Protection in Selected African Countries 
 
Source: Barrientos, A. and R. Holmes (2007) Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database. Version 3.0 
July 2007, DFID, UK. 
This overview of coping strategies used by households provides some explanation as to why 
consumption smoothing may not occur. In the first place, risk-sharing mechanisms do not cover all 
shocks. Second, the contributions may not be adequate to cover the entire financial implications of the 
shock. Third, the design of the risk-sharing institutions can result in the very poor being excluded. 
There is, therefore, a clear role for publicly provided interventions. 
One concern about the provision of public transfers is that they might crowd out private transfers. 
This will happen if the motive of the lender is purely altruistic. The motives for private giving can be 
driven by both altruism and the self-interest of the lender. If the act of giving provides satisfaction to 
the giver, then the provision of a social transfer to the recipient will not completely crowd out private 
transfers. 
Private transfers can also be provided as part of the traditional social insurance system. Thus, the 
private transfers can be provided as an insurance against the likelihood that the giver may experience a 
shock in the future and will need assistance. The person receiving the transfer does not necessarily 
have to be the one who will provide assistance in the future when the shock hits. Thus, even if a public 
social assistance programme is introduced, it is not likely that private transfers will decline by the 
same amount (Cox and Fafchamps, 2008). Empirical evidence suggests that some crowding out does 
happen, but it is not complete. In Ethiopia, for example, it has been found that targeted aid reduced 
private transfers in the aid-receiving households (Dercon and Krishnan, 2003). On the other hand, 
Gilligan et al., (2008) find that, depending upon how participation in the social assistance programme 
is defined, provision of social assistance does not crowd out private transfers. 
A second challenge is the issue of financing social protection. It is estimated that the average cost 
of a basic social assistance package that includes a universal pension for the elderly, provision for 
disability and child benefit would cost about two to three per-cent of Gross Domestic Product 
(Berendt, 2008). This may explain why several of the recently introduced social protection packages 
are not universal. Indeed, several of them are pilots (Table 3). When resources for social assistance are 
limited, targeting may be the next best alternative, instead of not implementing a social protection at 
Country  Year Started  Description  Objective Target Coverage 
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all. Effective targeting requires that the administrative and technical capacity exists in order to avoid 
the errors of targeting, i.e., including ineligible beneficiaries and/or excluding eligible beneficiaries. 
The institutions to implement an effective targeted social assistance programme in many African 
countries may be weak or non-existent. The pilot programmes should, therefore, provide a valuable 
learning curve prior to the eventual scaling up of these programmes. 
A rule of thumb has emerged that aims at targeting the proportion of the population in the lowest 
decile. However, there will be some resistance to targeting, especially when the economic status of 
excluded groups is not significantly different from that of the intended beneficiaries. Frictions can 
increase further if, as a result of the receipt of the transfers, the targeted households attain a per capita 
consumption level that exceeds households who were initially better off than they were (Ellis 2008). 
Targeting may also be resisted by the higher income groups (tax-payers) who are not expected to 
benefit from the transfers (Pritchett, 2005). 
6. Conclusion 
It is not unusual for an African household to be hit by more than one shock in quick succession. 
Households that have difficulty recovering from these shocks tend not to have coping mechanisms that 
are adequate to prevent the household from experiencing a decline in welfare as a result of the shock. 
The consequences of some shocks can remain for an extended period after they first hit mainly 
because of the weaknesses of the measures available to the household. The past experience of African 
households suggests that the current financial and economic crisis can result in several households 
registering declines in consumption if commodity prices should drop and if remittances should 
dwindle. The informal insurance mechanisms will not be able to insure households if these shocks hit 
a large number of households within a local setting. Indeed, the international nature of the current 
crisis means that households with an insurance network that spans continents will find that it will not 
provide them with the necessary insurance this time around. 
The reach of the formal financial institutions to rural households and the micro and small firms in 
the informal sectors of the economy remains limited. Novel measures have been adopted that link 
banks with the micro-finance organisations. For very poor and chronically poor households, however, 
credit or insurance, whether formal or informal, is not what is required, because they may find it 
difficult to repay the loans or pay the premiums. 
Public social safety-nets and social insurance are of limited coverage in Africa, and, in some cases, 
have only just been introduced. The poor need social assistance and insurance programmes that will 
help them build up and protect their asset base with the minimum of debt. 
In addition to social protection measures, public action is required to reduce the level of risk in 
African economies. The introduction of measures to reduce the incidence of risk in the lives of many 
households (for example, the provision of safe drinking water and sanitation will reduce the incidence 
of ill health and the introduction of irrigation facilities and improved water management practices can 
reduce vulnerability to the vagaries of the weather) will contribute to increasing the demand for formal 
sector finance and the supply of formal finance to the rural economy and the informal sector. It can 
also contribute to reducing the coverage of a social protection strategy. Abena D. Oduro 
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